BRIEFING NOTES - Cuba

6 November 1963

- I. From Castro's point of view, events since shortly after his return from the USSR last June have been unfavorable to his interests and a growing sense of frustration is probably weighing on him.
 - A. Prospects for significant economic improvement, at least over the next few years, were becoming dim even before the hurricane struck in early October.

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- B. Living conditions remain drab for the majority of the people and
- C. Additional disruptions to the economy and to the public morals are likely to result from the 4 October "second agrarian reform," which confiscates remaining privately owned farms larger than 167 acres.
- D. The Castro regime has responded with increasingly tight controls over the workers and over the population generally.
 - 1. Some of these maximum measures were taken on the pretext that of necessary measures to overcome the ravages of the hurricane, but the intention is evidently to maintain them in force after this excuse passes.
 - 2. There have been serious problems in the regime's attempts to maintain and increase labor productivity, as the workers samming aparticized have lost incentives and become apathetic.
 - 3. The attempts to standardize wages and establish work norms—along with penalties for failures to attain the norms—are running into

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- II. Open resistance against the Castro regime is still scattered and relatively ineffective.
 - A. There has, however, been an apparent increase in incidents of industrial sabotage in various towns and cities, particularly in western Cuba.
 - B. Small and scattered bands of guerrillas continue to operate, particularly in the hills of central Cuba, but their effectiveness is limited by their isolation and by the fact that they are always kept on the run by Castro's anti-insurgent forces. If any group of Cubans has benefited from the Castro regime it has been the peasants and thus the guerrillas are forced to operate in hostile territory.
 - C. The recent increase in exile raids against Cuban targets has given a boost to the morale of the opposition and added to Castro's own frustrations.
 - D. Incidents of passive resistance, such as work slowdowns and absenteeism, appear to be increasing.
- III. Castro evidently feels the need for some dramatic new victory to restore the momentum of his revolution and there are indications that what he has in mind is an attempt to initiate a revolutionary offensive elsewhere in Latin America.
 - A. This seems evident from the content of his recent speeches and the public pronouncements of his lieutenants

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B. Castro's subversive assets elsewhere in Latin America do not now appear strong enough for decisive revolutionary action in the near future, but they could spark serious disorders or establish initial gains that might ultimately threaten the target governments.